THE NEXT BABY M CASE: THE NEED FOR A
SURROGACY STATUTE
W. Marshall Prettyman*

I.

THE PARADIGM OF THE FAMILY

There was little surprise in the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision in In re Baby M,' in which the court found an executory
agreement terminating the parental rights of a surrogate mother
to be void and unenforceable. The decision follows the paradigm of the family which is the basis of family law-that the family consists of the adult man and woman who become husband
and wife and who, through their sexual intercourse, procreate a
child carried and given birth by the woman and raised by both
parents. The Baby M court expressed the paradigm as involving
the rights of children and their "natural" parents.
The surrogacy contract violates the policy of this State
that the rights of natural parents are equal concerning their
child, the father's right no greater than the mother's. "The
parent and child relationship extends equally to every child
and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the
parents. Baby M was born to her natural parents, Mary Beth Whitehead
and William Stern. In this instance, however, the traditional family
paradigm was not followed as William Stern was not married to
Mary Beth Whitehead, but to another woman. Mary Beth Whitehead was impregnated with the sperm of William Stern through artificial insemination. She then carried the fetus through pregnancy
and gave birth to their child.
Given that after the birth Whitehead refused to relinquish parental rights to her natural child, the court found that principles
governing parental termination were applicable: in the absence of a
finding of unfitness, the court will not sever the relationship be* B.A., Lafayette College, 197 1;J.D., Rutgers Univ. School of Law, 1974. Assistant Director of Clinical Services, Assistant Professor of Law, Seton Hall Univ.
School of Law. The author would like to express his appreciation to Ms. Rosaria A.
Suriano, a Seton Hall law student, for her assistance in the preparation of this
article.
I 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
2 Id. at 435-36, 537 A.2d at 1247 (quoting N.J. SrAr. ANN. § 9:17-40 (West
Supp. 1987)).
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tween the natural parent and the child. Without a finding that
Whitehead was unfit, there was no basis in existing law to terminate
her parental rights, despite the fact that she had agreed to give them
up in her pre-pregnancy agreement with William Stern.
II.

DOES BAir M

DECIDE THE NEXT CASE?

The supreme court indicated that its decision to render surrogacy contracts containing fee arrangements void and unenforceable might signal the end of surrogacy: "[A]Il parties
concede that it is unlikely that surrogacy will survive without
money. Despite the alleged selfless motivation of surrogate
mothers, if there is no payment, there will be no surrogates, or
very few.''"
It is unlikely that Baby Al will end surrogacy. Surrogate
parenting is a reaction to a severe shortage of white infants available for adoption.4 Typically, prospective parents must wait between three to seven years to adopt these infants.' Moreover,
adoption agency standards exclude older couples from adoption. ' The shortage of white infants available for adoption can be
attributed to three factors: increased use of contraception; the
availability of nontherapeutic abortion, and the decrease in the
social stigma attached to having an illegitimate child. 7 Surrogate
parenting provides a means of having an infant child without the
long waiting period associated with adoption and with the added
advantage of having the child genetically related to one of the
parents.
While the supply of adoptable children is shrinking, the demand to adopt is increasing due to the rise of infertility. Many
couples are waiting until later in life to have children when physically, the fertility of both men and women has declined considerably.' Moreover, increased infertility in women is linked to
intrauterine devices, abortion, increased incidence of venereal
3 Id. at 438, 537 A.2d at 1248. [he court assumes that its decision would be
eflective to stop surrogacy for a fee rather than addressing the efficacy issue of
whether surrogacy would be driven underground.
4 Landes & Posner, The Ecoiomics qft he Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STrUD. 323, 324
(1978).
5 Id. at 326.
(i
I.
7 1I.at 325. Interestingly, there are more illegitimate births, but because of the
decreased social stigma associated with having an illegitimate child, illegitimate
children are not being placed for adoption. Id.
8 J. LIERiAN-SMIT,
IN PURSUIT OF PREGNANCY 9 (1987). Both men and women
are most fertile in their mid-twenties. /d. For women, fertility begins to decline
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disease and exposure to toxic chemicals and radiation." Medically a couple is said to have an infertility problem if, after one
year of trying, the couple cannot conceive or carry a fetus to
term. " ' Approximately one couple in six has an infertility
problem. I
Surrogate parenting, however, is not a viable option for all
infertile couples.' 2 But, as a result of advances in medical techniques, the surrogate parenting option may be changing. Specifically, the presently accepted technique of in vitro fertilization
(IVF) allows couples to conceive using their own ovum and
sperm, but carried by a surrogate. There already have been
births using this technique.'" The result is a child genetically related to the couple, not the surrogate.
The next surrogacy case is likely to involve IVF. In such a
case, application of traditional family law made in Baby M is
troublesome and more problematic. Family law has always relied
on the concept that while it may be difficult to establish who a
child's father is, the mother's identity is always readily apparent.' 4 When the woman who bears the child is not its genetic
mother, as is possible with IVF, it is no longer certain who is the
natural mother.
With IVF, the elements of procreation, childbearing, and
child rearing all which form the paradigm for traditional family
after thirty and declines rapidly after thirty five. Id. For men, fertility declines
slowly after forty. Id.
1) Id. at 4.
14 Id.; E.B. MENNING, INFERTILITY: A GUIDE FOR THE CHILDLESS COUPLE 4 (1977).
1 J. LIEBMAN-SMITH, supra note 8, at 4; E.B. MENNING, supra note 10, at 4.
12

Of the one in six couples with an infertility problem, the female is the cause of

the problem approximately 40% of the time, the male approximately 40% of the
time, and in approximately 20% of the cases, both contribute to the problem. With

treatment, approximately 50% of the couples with infertility problems will conceive
and carry a fetus to birth. E.B. MENNING' supra note 10, at 5.
[3 Robertson, Embros, Families, and Procreative Libert': The Legal Structure of vew
Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 943 (1986) (the first in vitro fertilization birth

was on July 25, 1978). The in vitio fertilization (IVF) process involves surgically
removing an egg from a woman's ovary and placing it in a petri dish with a medium.
Note, .11'" Is For .llonev: Bab .11 and the Surrogate Mlotherhood controversV, 37 AM. U. L.
REV. 1013, 1018 n.33 (1988i (authored by Steven M. Recht). A man's sperm is also

placed in the dish. Id. If the egg is successfully fertilized it is placed in the uterus of
the woman who either donated the egg or in another woman, a surrogate birth
mother, and carried to term. Id.
In Baby ill, the Sterns considered using this process but rejected it because they
felt that the procedure was then too experimental. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super.
313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987); aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537
A.2d 1227 (1988).
14 Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268 (1978).
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law, can be roles now played by separate individuals. The sperm
donor is the genetic father; the egg donor the genetic mother.
But, the birth mother, whose womb is implanted with the fertilized egg and who carries the fetus through to childbirth, can be
someone other than the genetic mother. It may very well be that
the person or persons who assume a parental relationship to rear
the child may not have played any role in the procreation, pregnancy or birth of the child.
A surrogacy situation involving IVF fertilization of the birth
mother is different from the Baby M scenario because the birth
mother, Mary Beth Whitehead, was the natural mother of the
child Baby M. A procreation problem is raised with IVF surrogacy because the birth mother is not genetically related to the
child. But as the birth process becomes depersonalized with IVF
surrogacy, a surrogacy contract may be enforceable.
In Baby Al the contract attempted to characterize the transaction as a payment to Whitehead for her "services" rather than "a
fee for termination of parental rights or a payment in exchange
for consent to surrender a child for adoption."' 5 The NewJersey
Supreme Court viewed the contract's terminology as a sham to
avoid the application of the "baby-selling" statute.
Mr. Stern knew he was paying for the adoption of a child;
Mrs. Whitehead knew she was accepting money so that a child
might be adopted; the Infertility Center knew that it was being
paid for assisting in the adoption of a child. The actions of all
three worked to frustrate the goals of the statute. It strains
credulity to claim that these arrangements, touted by those in
the surrogacy business as an attractive alternative to the usual
route leading to an adoption, really amount to something
other than a private placement adoption for money.";
However, in the IVF surrogacy situation, the dilemma facing the
courts will be whether the contract is merely for services rendered
where the birth mother is not the natural mother in any genetic
sense. Framed another way, the debate will be whether pregnancy
and childbirth give the birth mother parental rights in the child that
is not genetically hers. From the viewpoint of the genetic partners,
however, the issue becomes whether they have the right to a parental relationship with the child despite the non-genetic contributions
of the birth mother.
15 Baby .11, 109 NJ. at 471 app. A, 537 A.2d at 1266 app. A (Surrogate Parenting
Agreement).
16 Id. at 424-25, 537 A.2d at 1241.
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The entire force of the court's opinion in Baby M is directed
toward protecting the interest of the natural mother. There was no
need for the court to define this term because Mary Beth Whitehead
was both the genetic and birth mother. Much of this force is removed from the opinion, however, if two women-the genetic and
the birth mothers-each has claim to be the natural mother. Arguably, the egg donor should be afforded the same parental rights as a
sperm donor. In this respect the court in Baby M gives some indication of the rights afforded to an egg donor as William Stern, the
sperm donor, was granted the status and rights of the "natural" father, contrary to the rights of Mr. Whitehead, the husband and presumed father of Whitehead's children.
The surrogacy contract in the IVF situation is very different
than that of Baby M. Regardless of whether a court would enforce it,
the contract could not justly be characterized as a sham as the contract was in Baby M. Baby M simply does not decide the next case.
III.

THE REGULATION OF SURROGACY:

THE NEED

FOR A STATUTE

Since the court in Baby M could link its opinion to the status

of Mary Beth Whitehead as the natural mother of Baby M, the
present structure of family law-the prohibition of "baby selling"
and the standard of unfitness for parental termination-provided
the means to decide the case. However, as the procreation/parenting process becomes a series of roles played by separate persons, the present structure will prove ineffective. Family
law has simply not kept up with current developments, some
medical and others social, that have caused the procreation and
parenting process to be broken down into its bare elements. The
legislature must address these new developments in surrogacy
because it is better equipped to address the broad legal rights
implicated and resolve the important social policy issues at stake.
In Baby 1 the supreme court invited the legislature to act:
If the Legislature decides to address surrogacy, consideration of this case will highlight many of its potential harms. We
do not underestimate the difficulties of legislating on this subject. In addition to the inevitable confrontation with the ethical and moral issues involved, there is the question of the
wisdom and effectiveness of regulating a matter so private, yet
of such public interest. Legislative consideration of surrogacy
may also provide the opportunity to begin to focus on the
overall implications of the new reproductive biotechnologyin vitro fertilization, preservation of sperm and eggs, embryo
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implantation and the like. The problem is how to enjoy the
benefits of the technology-especially for infertile coupleswhile minimizing the risk of abuse. The problem can be addressed only when society decides what its values and objectives are in this troubling, yet promising area. 7

IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF REGULATING SURROGACY

In deciding that the Baby M contract was void and not enforceable, the court made it clear that the "Legislature remains
free to deal with this most sensitive issue as it sees fit, subject
only to constitutional constraints."'" Presumably, legislation directed at surrogacy regulation rather than at its prohibition
would make surrogacy enforceable so long as the legislation and
its application in any particular case satisfied the constitutional
tests for procreative and parental rights.
One legislative response is to extend the judicial decision in
Baby M to all surrogacy situations. That could be accomplished
by amending the present baby-selling statute' to prohibit payments to birth mothers as well as to natural mothers. The prohibition of surrogacy, however, infringes on basic constitutional
rights.
A.

Constitutional Protection of the Right to Procreate
Various United States Supreme Court cases, regarding the

rights of familial privacy and procreation, limit any attempt to
regulate or prohibit surrogate parenting.2
While the exact
scope and nature of these rights has been neither clearly nor consistently elucidated by theCourt, its opinions have consistently
found a "right of the individual to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."'12- The decision to engage in surrogate parenting, thus,
would appear to fall within the ambit of constitutional protection.
This is especially the case where the decision to have a child
through surrogate parenting is necessitated by the wife's infertility. In those cases, the only means of having a child genetically
related to one or both of the parents is through surrogacy. The
17 Id. at 469, 537 A.2d at 1264.
I8 Id.
110 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1988).
20 Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
21 Carey,, 431 U.S. at 687.
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trial judge in Baby M found in procreation rights cases a compelling basis to enforce the surrogacy agreement.-" However, these
cases do not support the general enforcement of the surrogacy
agreement in Baby M. The procreative rights advanced by the
United States Supreme Court extend only to the decision to have
a child, and does not, as in the case of surrogacy, encompass the
decision to have a surrogate bear a child.
Procreative rights are unrelated to custody and termination
of parental rights, the aspects of the surrogate agreement sought
to be enforced in the Baby M case. These matters are governed
by state law and a separate line of Supreme Court cases that establish parental relationship rights as a constitutionally protected
liberty interest.21 If state law prohibits the enforcement of surrogacy agreements that provide for custody and termination of parental rights, then such a prohibition would not interfere with the
parties' procreative rights. In rejecting the trial judge's finding
that Mr. Stern had any constitutional basis for his claim to Baby
M free of her relationship to Mrs. Whitehead, the supreme court
in Baby M made the fundamental distinction between procreation
and the parental relationship:
The right to procreate very simply is the right to have natural
children, whether through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination. It is no more than that. Mr. Stern has not been
deprived of that right. Through artificial insemination of Mrs.
Whitehead, Baby M is his child. The custody, care, companionship, and nurturing that follow birth are not parts of the
right to procreation; they are rights that may also be constitutionally protected, but that involve many considerations other
than the right of procreation. To assert that Mr. Stern's right
of procreation gives him the right to the custody of Baby M
would be to assert that Mrs. Whitehead's right of procreation
does not give her the right to the custody of Baby M; it would
be to assert that the constitutional right of procreation includes within it a constitutionally protected contractual right
to destroy someone else's right of procreation.
While acknowledging Mr. Stern's right to procreation, including perhaps the right to engage in surrogacy, the court did not address his right to do so by contract because of conflict with the
procreation rights of Mrs. Whitehead. With IVF, however, the birth
22

Baby 3,

217 N.J. Super. al 384-87, 525 A.2d at 1163-65.

23 Santoskv v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645

(1972).
24

Baby 11, 109 N.J. 396, 448, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253-54 (1988).
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mother would not have procreation rights in the child. In that situation the question of the genetic parents' contract claim is consistent
with their procreative constitutional rights.
Further, the constitutional protection afforded procreative
rights is not absolute. States can pass legislation affecting procreative freedom so long as the state can show (1) a compelling state
interest and (2) the legislation is narrowly drawn to promote the
state's interest in the least detrimental manner affecting the personal procreation rights.2 5 No legislation in New Jersey directly regulates surrogacy, thus, the issue was not raised in Baby M. A
possible legislative response to surrogacy is, of course, a statute
flatly prohibiting surrogate parenting. The compelling state interest
most often articulated in support of legislation banning surrogate
parenting addresses the possible exploitation of poor women who
become surrogate mothers for women who wish to avoid the inconvenience of a nine-month pregnancy. 2 A ban on all surrogate
parenting, however, is too broad a response to the state concern
expressed.
A statute limiting surrogacy to situations where the wife was infertile would seem a far more appropriate method of balancing the
interests involved. This type of statute would eliminate those seeking to use surrogacy solely for personal convenience, yet only minimally affect their rights to procreate because they still would have
the ability to bear children naturally. Yet, in the case of a couple
where the wife is infertile, a ban on surrogacy precludes the couple
from having a child related to either parent, thereby having a far
greater impact on the couple's procreative rights. Further, the motivation of an infertile couple's search for a surrogate to have their
child lessens the chance of exploitation. Moreover, the motivation
of the surrogate mother in a case involving an infertile couple
reduces the chances of exploitation: studies have shown that while
monetary compensation is an important motivating factor, equally
important are the desire to give a couple unable to bear children a
7
child and the enjoyment of the experience of being pregnant. 2
25

Carer, 431 U.S. at 686.

26

Mellown, An Incomplete Picture. The Debate .1bout Surrogate .Mlotherhood, 8 HARV.
L.J. 23 (1985); H.T. Krimmel, The Case Against Surrogate Parenting, HAS-

WOMEN'S

TINGS CENTER REP.

35 (1983).

Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: nitial Findings, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
117 (1983); Franks, PschiatricEvaluation of W1'omen in a Simog-ate lother Program, 138
AM.J. PSYCHIAIRY 1387 (1981).
27
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Constitutional Protection of the ParentalRelationship

In accordance with an individual's constitutional procreative
rights, any legislation creating an enforceable right in the father
to have the surrogate mother's parental rights terminated may be
limited to an IVF surrogacy where the birth mother is not the
natural mother. In situations like Baby M, the full constitutional
reach of any legislation may provide a natural surrogate mother
with an interim period with the child after birth in order to decide whether to consent to the termination of her parental rights.
The argument, limiting surrogacy to infertile couples might present a more compelling state interest in any legislation that would
enforce the pre-pregnancy promise of a natural surrogate mother
to terminate her parental rights.
Since the surrogate or birth mother in the IVF situation is
not the natural mother as described in Baby M, legislation that
would enforce an executory agreement to terminate parental
rights made before the embryo was implanted in the surrogate
would not seem to invade the constitutional procreative rights of
the birth mother, insofar as that described by the court in Baby
M.2

8

Until recently, accepted psychological opinion asserted that
the birth of a child created a very strong bonding between the
mother and the child.2 ' It was thought that perhaps such bonding had an innate physiological aspect. However, more recent
studies have severely criticized this theory."' The present view
maintains that while the birth of a child does present a time when
there is a heightening of the potential for psychological bonding
between parent and child, this bonding is not nearly as compelling as first thought and certainly not crucial to the parent-child
relationship. Moreover, most surrogate mothers have willingly
relinquished parental rights on the birth of the child. Thus the
28 Legislation could be drafted to allow for the Baby m type of surrogacy, as well
as IVF surrogacy, but to treat them differently in terms of the consent to termination. If legislation limited surrogacy to IVF, those potential parents who could not
themselves contribute the egg or sperm for the in vitro procedure might nevertheless find others to contribute their sperm or egg. That, of course, further complicates the possible holders of procreative and parental relationship rights.
29 Klaus, Jerauld, Krerger, McAlpine, Steffa & Kennell, MaternalAttachment, 286
NEw ENG. J. MED. 460 (1972).
30 Myers, Mother-Infant Bonding: The Status of This Critical-Period Hypothesis, 4 DEv'I.

REv. 240-47 (1984); Kennell & Klaus, Nlother-I fant Bonding: Wl'eighing the Evidence, 4
DEV'L REV.

275-82 (1984), Myers, ilother-Infant Bonding: Rejoinder to Keniell and

Klaus, 4 DEV'L REv. 283-87 (1984).
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compelling argument that the bonding which occurs at the birth
of a child can be overcome.
Furthermore, the legislature should establish procedures to
screen out surrogate mother candidates who are more susceptible to the kind of psychological bonding that occurs at childbirth.
A psychologist testing Mrs. Whitehead prior to her becoming a
surrogate mother had reservations about her ability to relinquish
the child and suggested further testing,"' which, however, was
never done. The psychologist's report was never made available
to Mrs. Whitehead or to the Sterns:" Proper psychological
screening very well may have resulted in Mrs. Whitehead's rejection as a candidate for surrogate motherhood.
An additional constitutional question that any surrogacy legislation must satisfy concerns the fundamental interest in the parental relationship. In Baby M, Mrs. Whitehead asserted the
claim to the right to the companionship of her child. The
supreme court treated the issue as moot because Mrs. Whitehead
won without reaching the issue. It did, however, provide dicta as
to the nature of the parental relationship right in the context of
surrogacy. First, the court indicated that "custody and visitation
encompass practically all of what we call 'parental rights.' "33
Second, the court stated that the right to the companionship of a
31

The psychologist reported:
It is the examiner's impression that Ms. Whitehead is sincere in her plan
to become a surrogate mother and that she has thought extensively
about the plan. However, I do have some concern about her tendency
to deny feelings and think it would be important to explore with her in
somewhat more depth whether she will be able to relinquish the child at
the end. She mentioned that her husband has had a vasectomy and it
might be informative to find out why he did so and what her feelings
have been about no longer being able to conceive in their relationship.
In spite of much talk about how wearying she finds pre-school children,
she does care for her sister-in-law's two year old during the day and one
wonders about her underlying needs to have a child at home. She describes herself as having been deeply involved with her own two in earlier years and knows she should be encouraging more independence on
their part. She may have more needs to have another child than she is
admitting.
Except for the above reservations, Ms. Whitehead is recommended
as an appropriate candidate for being a surrogate volunteer.

Hanley, Father of Baby .l

Thought Vother Had Been Screened, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14,

1987, at 132 (excerpts of report). The report is available on request from the Bergen County Clerk's Office, Superior Court of New Jersey, Administrative Bldg.,
Main Street & Hudson St., Hackensack, NJ 07601.
32 Baby .11, 217 N.J. Super. at 383, 525 A.2d at 1163.
33 Bab .l,
109 N.J. at 451, 537 A.2d at 1255 (1988) (citation omitted).
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child "is a fundamental interest, constitutionally protected.'"'"
Third, and most important, the court, in characterizing the right
as not absolute, indicated that the parental relationship right
flowed from the status of the genetic or biological parent.
The parent-childbiological relationship, by itself, does not create a
protected interest in the absence of a demonstrated commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood; a natural parent
who does not come forward and seek a role in the child's life
has no constitutionally protected relationship.:
The birth mother in an IVF surrogacy may have no right to child
companionship because she is not the biological mother of the
child. Thus she is not the natural mother in the same sense that
Mrs. Whitehead was the natural mother of Baby M.
The Baby M decision, however, does vest some value in the
pregnancy and childbirth contribution of the birth mother in the
IVF surrogacy. In Baby M, Mrs. Stern raised an equal protection
claim that she was not treated equally with the husband of a woman
impregnated by the sperm of another man. Mrs. Stern asserted that
the procreative and parental rights of Mrs. Whitehead should be terminated in the same way that the sperm donor's rights would be
terminated in favor of the infertile husband of a woman artificially
inseminated. " The court, in distinguishing the two situations, gave
some value to the pregnancy and childbirth contribution of the birth
mother:
A sperm donor simply cannot be equated with a surrogate
mother. The State has more than a sufficient basis to distinguish the two situations-even if the only difference is between the time it takes to provide sperm for artificial
insemination and the time invested in a nine-month pregnancy-so as to justify automatically divesting the sperm donor of his parental rights without automatically divesting a
surrogate mother. Some basis for an equal protection argument might exist if Mary Beth Whitehead had contributed her
egg to be implanted, fertilized or otherwise,
in Mrs. Stern, re7
sulting in the latter's pregnancy.:'
This quote is the only indication that the court values the birth
mother's experience of pregnancy and childbirth as important to the
34 Id. at 450, 537 A.2d at 1255.
.3-5 Id. at 451 n.14, 537 A.2d 1255 n.14 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
36 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1988). Under the artificial insemination statute, a sperm donor gave up his procreative and parental relationship
rights to the husband of the woman impregnated.
37 Baby
, 109 N.J. at 450, 537 A.2d at 1254.
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constitutional discussion. Juxtaposed against it is the repeated emphasis on natural or biological rights.
In conclusion, the fundamental constitutional questions concerning surrogacy can be answered in a statute that allows but regulates surrogacy. Where the rights of the birth mother are limited
because her contribution consisted of impregnation, pregnancy and
childbirth, it may be possible for the state to enforce a commitment
before conception to give up the baby after it is born.
V.

POLICY CONCERNS IN THE REGULATION OF SURROGACY

The court in Baby M addressed a number of concerns that
are provident in any legislation that might address the issue of
surrogacy.
A.

Using a Contract Model

Private ordering in familial matters is not favored, and has
been recognized only after careful scrutiny of the family law principles involved and a judicial determination that those principles
will not be compromised by private agreements."
In most instances private ordering of family matters is subject to judicial
oversight and revision. Specifically dealing with custody and termination of parental rights, New Jersey courts have allowed limited private ordering with regard to custody" ' and effectively
none with regard to termination of parental rights." The only
:18 Even spousal support agreements, now generally considered enforceable,
were at one time not enforced by the courts on public policy grounds. See Sobel v.
Sobel, 99 N.J. Eq. 376, 132 A. 603 (N.J. 1925); White v. White, 87 N.J. Eq. 354, 100
A. 235 (N.J. 1917); Polyckronos v. Polyckronos, 17 N.J. Misc. 250, 8 A. 265 (Ch.
Div. 1939). It was not until 1960 in Schlemni v. Schlemnim, 31 N.J. 557, 581-82, 158
A.2d 508, 522 (1960), that the New Jersey Supreme Court found support agreements generally enforceable, and then only if "just and equitable." Thus, even in
the area where the courts have been most liberal in allowing private ordering, they
have retained a supervisory role.
:'1 While the courts give substantial deference to custody agreements of the parents, the courts are obligated to carefully examine whether any such agreement is
in the best interests of the child. The final decision always rests with the court and
the agreement is never the final determinant of custody. See Wist v. Wist, 101 N.J.
509, 503 A.2d 281 (1985); Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 491 A.2d 606 (1984); S.M.
v. S.J., 143 N.J. Super. 379, 363 A.2d 353 (Ch. Div. 1976); Montgomery v. Wilmerding, 26 N.J. Super. 214, 97 A.2d 745 (Ch. Div. 1953).
4o The only procedure for voluntary termination of parental rights in NewJersey
provides for voluntary surrender of a child to an adoption agency approved by the
state. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41 (West Supp. 1988). The agency would then have
the obligation to place the child for adoption. See id. § 9:3-41 (b). There is no procedure to voluntarily surrender parental rights in favor of another individual. Further, the state strictly controls and monitors the surrender under the standards set
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existing procedure to implement the termination provision of the
surrogate agreement is a private placement adoption. 4 However, a parent's consent to a private placement becomes effective
only after that consent is reiterated in front of a judge at the time
of the adoption.4 2 Consent prior to the adoption hearing is not
binding. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby M emphasized
that the surrogacy contract's provision, that Mrs. Whitehead
would surrender custody and terminate all parental rights, violated the statutes and policies of the state because it contained no
clause giving her the right to rescind the contract.43
An argument can be made that a contractual model is therefore unavailable even within the context of legislation authorizing and regulating surrogacy. In opposition, it can be argued
that as long as all the elements of regulation are satisfied by the
terms of the surrogacy contract, a contractual model is acceptable and, indeed, a superior way to structure surrogacy. If the legislature decides to allow surrogacy, placing the regulation into a
contractual model may be desirable because people may adhere
to the terms of the surrogacy, if they have agreed to them in a
contractual sense, perhaps more so than they would where they
have never signed on the dotted line.
1.

Prebirth Breach

The provisions of a typical surrogate parenting agreement
that may raise issues of breach of the agreement prior to the birth
of the child revolve around conditions common to many surrogate agreements, including the agreement in the Baby M case,
up by an approved agency. Id. § 9:3-41. Such a surrender can be reviewed by the
courts and overturned if the courts find consent to the termination improper. See
Sorentino v. Family & Children Soc'y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127, 367 A.2d 1168
(1976).
41 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48 (West Supp. 1988). This is the only procedure by
which a child can be given to an individual chosen by the parent. See id. The other
procedure for surrender of a child for adoption provides for the surrender to be to
an approved agency which then chooses the adoptive parents. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3-41 (West Supp. 1988).
42 The natural parent shall have the right to object to any adoption, and the
adoption will not be granted unless "the court finds that such parent has substantially failed to perform the regular and expected parental functions of care and
support of the child, which shall include maintenance of an emotional relationship
with the child." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46(a) (West Supp. 1988). See also A.L. v. P.A.,
213 N.J. Super. 391, 517 A.2d 494 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that the natural parents' signing of a consent to adoption annexed to the private placement adoption
complaint was of no effect when the natural parents revoked the consent prior to
the adoption hearing).
4"3 Baby M, 109 N.J. at 429, 537 A.2d at 1244.
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providing that the surrogate mother had to take certain specific
measures regarding maternal health and prohibiting non-therapeutic abortion. Typical contractual prenatal health provisions
are that the surrogate mother must undergo amniocentesis by a
specific point in the pregnancy, that the surrogate mother must
see an obstetrician at specific intervals throughout the pregnancy, and that she must refrain from use of tobacco, alcohol or
drugs during the pregnancy.
The provisions requiring abstention from tobacco, alcohol
and drugs are largely thought to be unenforceable, because in
most cases the provisions would not be amenable to redress by
damages.4" While there is scientific evidence that use of these
substances during pregnancy increases the risk of birth defects,
in most cases it would be difficult to attribute a given birth defect
to the use of such substances. There are a few clear exceptions
to this, such as when a child is born with fetal alcohol syndrome
or addicted to a given drug. Here the surrogate could be looked
to for damages in the form of medical costs associated with caring for these particular problems. The damages, if any, caused
by the use of tobacco, alcohol or drugs would often be speculative and difficult, if not impossible, to prove. In this type of situation, courts have traditionally found the remedy at law
inadequate and allowed equitable relief. 5 However, in this situation, equitable relief would also be unavailable. Equitable relief
would require a continuing injunction to stop the surrogate from
using the prohibited substances. Courts of equity have traditionally chosen not to act when to do so would impose on the court a
duty of continuing and pervasive supervision.4" The court cannot constantly monitor the surrogate's use of these substances.
Prenatal health care provisions do not raise the same
problems. While the provisions are not amenable to enforcement through damages because of their speculative nature, there
is no reason why the courts could not order a surrogate mother
to see an obstetrician on a regularly scheduled basis during the
pregnancy. This would not involve undue supervision since the
courts would merely monitor whether the prenatal visits ocMady, Surogate V\others: The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J. L. & MED. 323 (1981).
45 Curtice Bros. Co. v. Cats, 72 N.J. Eq. 831, 66 A. 935 (Ch. Div. 1907).
44

44 Fleischer v.James Drug Stores, I N.J. 138, 62 A.2d 383 (1948); Fiedler, Inc. v.
Coast Finance, Inc., 129 N.J. Eq. 161, 18 A.2d 268 (1940); Sarokhan v. Fair Lawn
Memorial Hosp., 83 N.J. Super. 127, 199 A.2d 52 (App. Div. 1964); Carberry v.
Carberry, 137 N.J. Eq. 9, 43 A.2d 215 (Ch. Div. 1945); Q uigley Co. v. Asbestos
Ltd., 23 N.J. Misc. 301,44 A.2d 89 (Ch. Div. 1945).
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curred by having a third party, namely the obstetrician, confirm
compliance with the order. Since such prenatal health care can
only enhance the chances of the child being born healthy, there
would also seem to be strong public policy reasons for the courts
to enforce such a provision.4 7
Provisions for amniocentesis do not in and of themselves
present a problem for the courts. Amniocentesis, much like regular prenatal visits to the obstetrician, is a procedure enforceable
by court order. An amniocentesis provision presents the same
problems with respect to the speculative nature of any damages,
making it a provision best enforced through equitable remedies.
The New Jersey Legislature may very well wish to obviate the
need for amniocentesis in many surrogate parenting situations by
having the surrogate and the natural father submit to genetic
testing prior to insemination to detect any defect or incompatibility. In such cases, unless the surrogate mother was of an age
where the factor alone posed risks of genetic defects thereby indicating the need for amniocentesis, 4" there would be no need
for the procedure.4 " ' This provision envisions that should testing
reveal a possible genetic incompatibility between the surrogate
and the natural father, the insemination might still occur. If
47 Coleman, Surogate Ilotherhood."Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions for Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REV. 71 (1982).
48 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, in AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, AMNIOCENTESIS FOR PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS
OF GENETIC DISORDERS (Nov. 1983), recommends the procedure for

pregnant women over the age of 35.
49 The amniocentesis provision in the Baby 31 agreement provided for genetic
testing and amniocentesis if the inseminating physician felt it would be needed.
Specifically it stated:
13. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, agrees that she will not
abort the child once conceived except, if in the professional medical
opinion of the inseminating physician, such action is necessary for the
physical health of MARY BETH WHITEHEAD or the child has been
determined by said physician to be physiologically abnormal. MARY
BETH WHITEHEAD further agrees, upon the request of said physician
to undergo amniocentesis (see Exhibit "D") or similar tests to detect
genetic and congenital defects. In the event said test reveals that the
fetus is genetically or congenitally abnormal, MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, agrees to abort the fetus upon demand of WILLIAM
STERN, Natural Father, in which event, the fee paid to the Surrogate
will be in accordance to Paragraph 10. If MARY BETH WHITEHEAD
refuses to abort the fetus upon demand of WILLIAM STERN, his obligations as stated in this Agreement shall cease forthwith, except as to
obligations of paternity imposed by statute.
Baby .1, 109 N.J. at 473 app. A, 537 A.2d at 1268 app. A (Surrogate Parenting
Agreement).
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amniocentesis reveals that the fetus has a genetic abnormality,
the fetus can be aborted. A legislature might well decide that the
potential for such genetic abnormality should, by law, disqualify
the proposed mother as a surrogate for that particular couple.
While states do not restrict the choice of married couples to conceive children in the face of known risks of genetic defects, they
may very well decide not to allow such risks when the conception
is preplanned, as in surrogacy where the consequence is merely
the selection of a substitute and surrogate.
The major problem connected with amniocentesis provisions is that they typically contain a provision that if the procedure shows a defect in the fetus the natural father may demand
that the surrogate abort the child. The Baby M agreement contained such a provision.50 This raises serious problems for both
the courts and any legislature choosing to allow or mandate such
provisions.
The United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade5 found
that during the first trimester of pregnancy, a woman, in consultation with her doctor, has an absolute right to choose to have an
abortion. During the second trimester the state has rights to restrict abortion by requiring certain medical procedures, but it
cannot interfere with the woman's choice to abort. This right has
been found to be one that attaches solely to the woman. The
father of the child cannot stop her from aborting.12 Further, his
responsibilities are in no way abrogated if the mother refuses to
abort after the father has both demanded that she do so and
agreed to pay for it. The provision of the Baby M agreement providing that Mr. Stern could demand an abortion was, therefore,
contrary to these constitutional protections.
The natural father has limited opportunities to breach the
agreement prior to the child's birth. His only real duties prior to
the birth of the child are his obligation to pay for medical care
and testing, such as the amniocentesis referred to in the surrogate agreement. Should the natural father refuse to pay for these
services, the surrogate could seek damages. Since damages
would adequately compensate for the breach, there is no need
for any form of equitable relief. Should the natural father, prior
to the birth of the child, declare he was unwilling to take custody,
50

See supra note 49.

51 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52 Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1973); see also Coleman v. Coleman, 57 Md. App. 755, 471 A.2d 1115 (Ct. Spec. App. 1984). -

912

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:896

the surrogate could treat the statement as an anticipatory breach
and proceed to have an abortion, if not too late in the pregnancy,
or could carry the child to term and employ the remedies discussed in the next section.
2.

Post-Birth Breach

After the birth of the child, the natural father could refuse to
accept custody of the child. It is unlikely that the courts would
compel an unwilling parent to take possession of a child. In such
a situation the surrogate mother must either retain custody of the
child or place the child for adoption. Should the surrogate
mother retain custody of the child, the natural father would be
responsible for child support until the child is emancipated. 5 "
The general rule regarding child support now favors finding the
parents equally responsible for support to the extent that each is
financially capable.5 4 However, given the surrogate agreement,
where the father has agreed to assume full responsibility for the
child, courts should find that the entire duty to support the child
falls on the natural father. 55 Should the child be placed for adoption, the natural father would be responsible for any and all support until the child is adopted, plus any other adoption expenses.
Further, if the child cannot be adopted and the surrogate places
the child in an institution, the natural father should be primarily
liable to the state for the cost of raising the child. This is important because the most likely scenario in which the natural father
would choose not to take the child is where the child is born with
a defect. 5" Such a child is far less adoptable and more likely to be
5's While 18-year old children are for most purposes considered emancipated,
there are exceptions in the area of child support. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17B-1
(West Stipp. 1988). The duty to pay child support continues after the age of 18 if
the child becomes disabled prior to reaching that age, see Kruvant v. Kruvant, 100
N.J. Super. 107, 241 A.2d 259 (App, Div. 1968), or, with certain limitations, attends
college after turning 18, see Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 275 A.2d 132 (1971), or,
under very limited circumstances, graduate school, see Ross v. Ross, 167 N.J.
Super. 441, 400 A.2d 1233 (Ch. Div. 1979).
54 The New Jersey Court Rules formulate equal support obligations by providing detailed tables for calculating child support based on the proportion of each
parent's income in relation to the total family income. See N.J. CT. R. 5:6A.
55 While, under New.Jersey Court Rule 5:6A, the courts generally order each
parent to pay his or her proportionate share of child support, courts are obligated
to enforce support agreements between the parties unless they find the agreement
is not "just and equitable." Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 477 A.2d 1257 (1984).
Given the circumstances surrounding a surrogate birth, there is no reason to expect
that the courts will not find it 'just and equitable," based on the surrogate agreement to fix primarily the entire burden for child support on the natural father.
56 The one publicized incident of the natural father refusing to take custody of
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institutionalized. Under the terms of the surrogate agreement
the natural father should be responsible for the cost of
institutionalization.
The natural father could avoid his duty to support the child
only if he could prove he is not the natural father. While in paternity cases it is generally the duty of the natural mother to
prove who is the natural father, in surrogacy cases the signed
agreement in which the natural father indicates his intention to
father a child by surrogate mother should place on him the burden of proof.17 In any case, proof in paternity cases has been
greatly simplified by recent advances in blood-matching tests.
It is now possible in most cases to eliminate through bloodmatching tests from ninety percent to over ninety-nine percent of
the population as the child's possible father. In a surrogate setting, unless the natural father has been excluded by the bloodthe child involved Alexander Malahoff, who contracted with Judy and Ray Stiver for
Mrs. Stiver to act as a surrogate mother. The child was born with microcephaly, a
birth defect associated with mental retardation, and Mr. Malahoff refused to take
the child. Subsequent blood tests showed that Mr. Stiver, and not Mr. Malahoff,
was the father of the child. Apparently, Mrs. Stiver had not been told to abstain
from sexual relations with her husband immediately prior to the artificial insemination. See Andrews, The Stork Varket: Law of the Vew Reproductive Technologies, 70

A.B.A.J. 50, 56 (1984).
57 The old law regarding paternity placed a heavy burden on the mother to
clearly establish who was the father of the child. Further, if she was married, she
had to first overcome the strong presumption that her husband was the father "by
showing no access of her husband." See La Ferra v. Watts, 7 N.J. Misc. 889, 891,
148 A. 180, 181 (Juv. Ct. 1929). The Uniform Parentage Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:17-38 (West Supp. 1988), represents a modern approach by providing a series
of presumptions as to paternity. If none of the presumptions apply, paternity is to
be decided by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 9:17-43(d). The only presumption regarding signed acknowledgments of paternity, which the surrogate
agreement would appear to be, is contained in section 9:17-43(a)(6). However,
that provision provides that the acknowledgment must be filed with the local register of vital statistics. Id. § 9:1 7-43(a)(6). While it would seem appropriate for such
a filing to be required for surrogate agreements in New Jersey, this was not done in
the Baby l case. Without filing, there is no presumption of paternity under the
Uniform Parentage Act that would apply in cases of surrogate parenting. Id.
§ 9:17-44.
58 The Human Leukocyte Antigen Test (HLA test) has now become the accepted blood-matching test in paternity cases by a majority of the states. Kay &
Kanuischer, Admissibility of Genetic Testiig in Paternity Litigation: A Suriey of State Statiles, 22 FAM. L. Q. 109, 110 (1988). Unlike the earlier ABO blood-matching test

that could only exclude possible fathers, the HLA test often has such a high inclusion rate (often 98% or better and rarely less than 90%) that courts are allowing
the results of the test as proof of paternity as well as of nonpaternity. See J.H. v.
M.H., 177 N.J. Super. 436, 426 A.2d 1073 (Ch. l)iv. 1980); Malvasi v. Malvasi, 167
N.J. Super. 513, 401 A.2d 279 (Ch. Div. 1979). See also Terasaki, Resolution by HL
Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases .\ot E'xcluded by .IBO Testing, 16J. FAM. L. 543 (1978).
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matching test, he should be found to be the child's father. In
Baby M, the issue of paternity did arise, albeit on the part of the
Whiteheads, not Mr. Stern, when Mrs. Whitehead asserted that
her husband, not Mr. Stern, was the child's father. Using the
Human Leukocyte Antigen Test (HLA) blood grouping test, Mr.
Whitehead was excluded as the father and there was a 99.96%
chance that Mr. Stern was the natural father." Given the high
inclusion rate typical in HLA testing and the written agreement
to conceive the child with the surrogate mother, proof of paternity need not present a problem in surrogate parenting cases.
A post-birth breach of the agreement by the surrogate
mother was, of course, the specific issue addressed in Baby M.
After the child's birth, Mrs. Whitehead refused to turn the child
over to the natural father. Prior to Baby M it was felt that the only
remedy available to the natural father would be a custody action.") The problems surrounding breach after the birth present
an important reason to make surrogate agreements enforceable.
As presently drafted, surrogate agreements are unenforceable
against one of the interested parties, namely the natural father's
wife, who ostensibly has been excluded from the agreement, to
avoid possible problems with the baby-selling laws. However, all
the parties assume that the wife of the natural father shall,
through adoption, become the mother of the child conceived as a
result of the surrogate agreement. By eliminating the wife from
any participation in the agreement, there are no enforceable
rights against her during the life of the agreement. She only becomes responsible for the child on the completion of the adoption. At this point the surrogate agreement is fully performed,
eliminating any basis for bringing an action under it.
However, assume a factual scenario where the natural father
dies prior to the child's birth. Here it would certainly be appropriate for his wife, who intended to become the child's mother, to
be responsible for, and to take custody of the child. It is also
quite possible that the wife will no longer wish to do so. The
surrogate mother would have no enforceable rights against the
wife and could only proceed against the estate of the husband."'
59
iO

Baby .l, 217 N.J. Super. at 328-29, 525 A.2d at 1135.
Mady, supra note 44; Mawdsley, Sun-ogate Parenthood. A Needfor Legislative Direc-

tion, 71 ILL. B.J. 412, 415 (1983); Lorio,AlternativeAleans of Reproduction: Virgin Ternitor'for Legislation, 44 LA. 1L.REV. 1641, 1644 (1989).
6l The claim against the husband's estate may be of little value. An afterborn
child who is not provided for in the parent's will is entitled to a share of the estate
equal to what the child would receive under intestate succession law. See N.J. STAT.
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A stepmother, which is what the wife of the natural father would
be prior to the adoption, can only be held responsible for support in two limited cases. The first is where the stepmother has
stood in loco parentis to the child." 2 In surrogacy, there is no opportunity for the stepmother to stand in loco parentis during the
life of the agreement, thereby eliminating any legal basis to collect child support from her. The second justification for stepmother support is that she, through her actions, is estopped from
denying a duty to support."" This would occur where the stepmother has indicated to the natural parent that she will provide
support for the stepchild, inducing the natural parent to rely on
that assertion, and change his or her position in a way that affects
the natural parent's ability to provide support. By carefully insulating the natural father's wife from the surrogate agreement, the
parties have probably precluded such an estoppel, even though
the agreement and the surrogacy process imply an assertion by
the stepmother that she will support and care for the child. Any
legislation seeking to enforce surrogacy agreements should
clearly establish the involvement in the process of the natural father's wife, including her obligations to the child.
3.

Additional Considerations

There are several issues that a legislature might wish to consider in a broad-based statutory response to surrogate parenting.
The first is whether there should be any restrictions on who may
become a surrogate mother. The legislature may choose to enact
a provision for mandatory psychological testing to screen out
surrogate mother candidates whose psychological make-up indicates they would have problems in relinquishing the child. An§ 3B:5-16 (West 1983). Under New Jersey intestate succession law, a child
who is not the child of the surviving spouse divides equally one-half of the estate
with the other children of the decedent. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:5-3(d), :5-4 (West
1983). Since in surrogacy, the child will in most cases be the only child of the
decedent, the child will receive one-half of the estate. If the husband is affluent, the
child's claim could be substantial. If, however, as was the case in Baby .l, the father
is middle class, the only major asset is probably the marital home, which if owned
by the entirety, passes directly to the spouse, leaving nothing in the probate estate
for the child.
2 M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 100 N.J. 567, 498 A.2d 775 (1985); Amadeo v.Amadeo, 64
N.J. Super. 417, 166 A.2d 397 (App. Div. 1960); D. v. D., 56 N.J. Super. 357, 153
A.2d 332 (App. Div. 1959); A.S. v. B.S., 139 N.J. Super. 366, 354 A.2d 100 (Ch.
Div. 1976), aff'd, 150 N.J. Super. 122, 374 A.2d 1259 (App. Div. 1977).
63:' Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984); Ross v. Ross, 126 N.J.
Super. 394, 314 A.2d 623 (Juv. Dom.Rel. 1973), aft'd, 135 N.J. Super. 35, 342 A.2d
566 (App. Div. 1975).
ANN.
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other possible qualification is that a surrogate mother already
must have had at least one child. A woman who has had a child is
in a better position to assess whether, after bearing a child, she
will be able to relinquish the child to the natural father and his
wife. Both of these requirements would enhance the probability
that surrogate mother's decision to relinquish the child was made
knowingly, even though prior to the birth and conception of the
child.
Another area beyond the scope of judicial inquiry that the
legislature may wish to address is the regulation or prohibition of
intermediary agencies in the surrogate process. In Baby M, the
Infertility Center of New York (ICNY) acted as an intermediary
between the parties. The ICNY solicited Mrs. Whitehead as a
surrogate and the Sterns went to it for assistance in finding a surrogate. The ICNY obtained the psychological tests of Mrs.
Whitehead. It also failed to disclose the results of the testing to
the Sterns or to Mrs. Whitehead, even though the test results expressed reservations as to Mrs. Whitehead's ability to relinquish
the child upon birth."4
One important object of any surrogacy legislation would be
to establish a procedure for careful psychological screening of
potential surrogate mother candidates to ascertain if they have
the appropriate psychological make-up to relinquish the child
upon birth. It is extremely important to the success of such legislation that the entity administering the test vigorously screen the
surrogate mother candidates. A legislature which will allow a
surrogate mother to surrender a child prior to the birth of the
child, should insure that the consent be made knowingly. Indeed
the question of whether such a consent can ever be knowingly
made has led states to enact termination procedures that preclude consent to adoption or termination prior to the child's
birth. If the policy regarding prebirth consent is to be changed
to make surrogate arrangements enforceable, it must be done in
a way that rigorously ensures that the surrogate mother's consent
is truly final and will not be altered by the birth of the child.
It is questionable whether the profit-motivated agencies that
presently conduct the screening in surrogate parenting can be
relied on to exercise the vigorous scrutiny necessary to ensure
that the consent is final. Intermediaries such as the ICNY receive
no compensation if they cannot match a surrogate mother to a
couple seeking a surrogate. As illustrated in Baby M, this can
64

Baby 11, 217 NJ. Super. at 343, 525 A.2d at 1142.
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lead the agency to ignore clearly expressed reservations of the
psychologist as to the fitness of a potential surrogate, rather than
engage in additional testing that might disqualify a candidate.
Even the present psychological testing by the agencies may not
be a result of any real desire on their part to screen surrogate
candidates, but rather a result of the concern by the couple,
given the recognition that surrogate agreement provisions regarding termination may be unenforceable. It is the couple who
wants the testing to ensure themselves that at the child's birth the
surrogate will voluntarily relinquish the child, avoiding the gutwrenching courtroom confrontations that occurred in Baby M.
The intermediary agencies present other problems for the
surrogate parenting process."5 Since the agencies draft the surrogate agreements they, not surprisingly, favor the couple who
pay the agency its fee. Typically, if the surrogate consults an attorney regarding the agreement, it is usually one provided by the
agency. While ethically bound to represent the interest of the
surrogate, such counsel cannot be expected to criticize the agreement vigorously.
Any legislation enforcing surrogate arrangements should include a provision for an investigation of the fitness of the couple
as parents prior to conception, similar to the investigation presently done in adoption cases."" Such an investigation would be
better left to state regulated adoption agencies than the profitmotivated surrogacy intermediaries who would be asked to investigate the parties paying their fees.
Any legislative response to traditional surrogacy must be
mindful of the fact that advances in reproductive technology are
already making surrogate arrangements of the type in Baby M obsolete. The next major variation in surrogacy arrangements that
the legislature must address is surrogate parenting arrangements
wherein the surrogate mother is impregnated with a fertilized
embryo of the couple. The use of IVF in surrogate parenting
must be addressed by the legislature as it creates a virtual Pandora's box. The courts have always relied on the concept that
while it may be difficult to establish who a child's father is, the
mother's identity is always readily apparent."7 When the woman
who bears the child is not its genetic mother, as is possible with
IVF, no longer is it certain that the natural mother's identity will
65
""
67

See Mellown, supra note 26, at 236.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3-47(b), :3-48(a)(2) (West Supp. 1988).
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268 (1978).
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be clear. While a thorough legislative response to surrogate
parenting would address the problems raised by IVF, the result
in the courts, without such legislative guidance, is totally unpredictable. The key to this dilemma will rest primarily on how the
courts will decide who is the child's mother.
The most interesting question here concerns whether the
differences between IVF surrogacy and Baby M surrogacy might
be the basis for different treatment. Where the surrogate is only
the birth mother and not the genetic mother, the question is who
has the reproductive right. If the right does not reside in the
birth mother because she was artificially inseminated with the fertilized egg of the parents, then the legislature may be allowed to
regulate reproductive decisions in IVF surrogacy where a similar
regulation could not have been made if the natural mother's
rights were at stake.
B.

Fee Arrangements

The real problem in utilizing a contractual model arises in
the provision for the payment of fees to the surrogate over and
above medical and lost earning expenses attributable to the pregnancy and childbirth. One major thrust of the Baby M opinion is
the court's ruling that the surrogacy contract violated the babyselling statute because Mrs. Whitehead was to receive a fee."8
Presumably, any legislation that allows fees to be paid to a surrogate above her expenses would be read in pan materia with the
baby-selling statute. More important is the court's reasoning as
to why the fee is objectionable. "Almost every evil that
prompted the prohibition of the payment of money in connection
with adoptions exists here.""" First, the court surmised that surrogacy would not survive without money."' Second, "the
purchase of a woman's procreative capacity, at the risk of her life,
is caused by and originates with the offer of money."'" Third,
unlike adoption where the mother can relieve herself of the financial obligations of parental support by giving up her child to
an approved agency, "[i]n surrogacy, the highest bidders will
presumably become the adoptive parents regardless of suitability, so long as payment of money is permitted. 7 - Fourth, an ir68 Baby M, 109 N.J. at 423, 537 A.2d at 1240.
6' Id. at 438, 537 A.2d at 1248.
70 Id.

71

Id.

72 1,/,
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revocable consent is given in exchange for the promise of money
so far in advance of the baby's birth, that the consent cannot be
viewed as informed, regardless of whether counselling or advice
is provided once the baby is born.7"
In the larger context, the court posited that payment of fees
meant that surrogates would typically come from a lower economic status than would the adoptive parents. "[I]t is unlikely
that surrogate mothers will be as proportionately numerous
among those women in the top twenty percent income bracket as
among those in the bottom twenty percent. Put differently, we
doubt that infertile couples in the low-income bracket will find
upper income surrogates. 7 4
With all of this emphasis on the evils of fees paid to the surrogate, legislation allowing such fees would be viewed skeptically
by the courts. While a surrogacy arrangement providing for no
fee might be found enforceable, so long as the surrogate mother
"is given the right to change her mind and to assert her parental
rights," 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court has made it clear that
the existence of a fee renders any such agreement unenforceable,
based on the better of the present baby-selling statute, and more
importantly, the public policies underlying the statute.
C.

Fee-Earning Surrogacy Agencies

While the Baby M court condemns fees paid to surrogates, it
is also hostile to the fees received by agencies providing surrogacy arrangements. The profit motive undermines the function
of the agency.
In the scheme contemplated by the surrogacy contract in
this case, a middle man, propelled by profit, promotes the
sale. Whatever idealism may have motivated any of the participants, the profit motive predominates, permeates, and ultimately governs the transaction. The demand for children is
great and the supply small. 7"

If surrogacy legislation is to survive judicial scrutiny in NewJersey,
the profit motive must be removed from the role of the agency, public or private, charged with regulating surrogacy. Altruism is necessary before the court will accept any of the agency's activities as
Id. at
Id. at
REV. 1849,
7 id. at
76 Id. at
73
74

438-39, 537 A.2d
440, 537 A.2d at
1930 (1987)).
469, 537 A.2d at
439, 537 A.2d at

at 1248.
1249 (citing Radin, Alarkel Inalienability, 100

1264.
1249.

HARV.

L.
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legitimate. Otherwise, those activities, whether they be counselling
or testing, will be viewed as shams to make the transaction something other than what it is-a profit making enterprise.
The court best surmised its reaction to fees paid to the surrogate as well as to the private agency setting up the arrangement
when it said: "There are, in a civilized society, some things that
money cannot buy. In America, we decided long ago that merely
because conduct purchased by money was 'voluntary' did not mean
that it was good or beyond regulation and prohibition."7 7 This
deep-seated skepticism about the intrusion of money into the question of surrogacy portended the demise of the then-pending
legislation.
VI.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES

The New Jersey Supreme Court made it clear in the very beginning of the Baby M decision that its ruling was not meant to
preclude a legislative response to surrogate parenting. In the introductory segment of the opinion the court stated: "Moreover,
our holding today does not preclude the Legislature from altering the current statutory scheme, within constitutional limits, so
as to permit surrogacy contracts." ' 78 The court, while refusing to
be specific, hints at the parameters of the constitutional limitations of the legislature's ability to enact a statute enforcing surrogate agreements. The court stated that such legislation must be
in response to a compelling state interest, and that prior to termination of parental rights the surrogate must have voluntarily and
knowingly consented to the surrender of the child. 7' Finally, the
last paragraph of the opinion invites the legislature to consider
surrogacy as a means of addressing the legal and ethical questions raised by such new reproductive biotechnology as IVF,
preservation of sperm and ova, and embryo implantation."
The legislature's response to the supreme court's Baby M decision has been much more deliberate than its response to the
trial court decision. Pridr to the supreme court decision, nine
separate bills were proposed in the New Jersey Legislature dealing either directly with surrogate parenting or with procedures
relating to it. One bill sought to prohibit surrogate parenting by
77 Id. at 440, 537 A.2d at 1249 (citing West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.

379 (1937)).
78 Id. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1235.
79 Id. at 452 n.16, 537 A.2d at 1255 n.16.
8o Id. at 469, 537 A.2d at 1264.
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amending the New Jersey baby-selling statute to include the prohibition of payments made pursuant to surrogate agreements."'
A second bill, aimed at making surrogate-parenting contracts
valid in New Jersey, was, in effect, no more than a legislative version of the trial court opinion."2 The third bill, dealing directly
with surrogate parenting, took a middle approach that would
have allowed surrogacy contracts to a limited degree, strictly for
infertile couples, and under strict judicial guidelines and supervision." Four other bills dealt with such procedures as artificial
insemination, in vitro and in vivo fertilization8" and freezing of
sperm, ova 8 6 and embryos.7
All of these proposed statutes contain provisions that reflect
a recognition by the authors of the proposals that these new technologies may have application in surrogate parenting. The final
two proposed bills provided for commissions to study the subject
and report back to the legislature. 8 Ultimately, none of the legislation was passed. The legislature opted instead to follow the
suggestion of the New Jersey Supreme Court and created the
Commission on Legal and Ethical Problems in the Delivery of
Health Care (Bioethics Commission) to study not only the whole
area of reproductive biotechnology, but the whole range of questions presented by advances in biotechnology.
The Bioethics Commission has created a subgroup, the Task
Force on New Reproductive Practices, to study and make recommendations regarding reproductive practices in general and surrogate parenting in particular. The task force contains five
members of the Bioethics Commission plus, sitting ex officio, the
chairman and vice chairman of the commission. The other fourteen members of the task force, who are not members of the
commission, represent a broad range of specialties including
"medicine, reproductive and molecular biology, public health,
clinical and developmental psychology, social work, family law,
adoption, women's rights, theology and philosophy." 8 ' The task
81 A. 4138, 202d Leg., 2d Sess. (1987).
82 A. 3038 202d Leg., 1st Sess. (1986).
83 S. 481, 201st Leg., 1st Sess (1984), reintroduced as S. 767, 202d Leg., 1st Sess.
(1986).
84 A. 3037, 202d Leg., 1st Sess. (1986).
85 A. 3036, 202d Leg., 1st Sess. (1986).
8( A. 3040, 202d Leg., 1st Sess. (1986).
87 A. 3039, 202d Leg., Ist Sess. (1986).
88 A.J. Res. 76, 202d I.eg., 1st Sess. (1986); S. 3302, 202d Leg., 2d Sess. (1987).
89 COMMISSION
CARE,

ON LEGAL ANI) ETHICAl. PROBLEMS IN THE DELIVERY

RFPRODUCTIVE ISSUES (Jan. 30, 1989).
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force has spent the last year studying surrogacy. They have
drafted a series of policy recommendations on surrogacy for discussion and vote at their March 1989 meeting.!" ° These recom'(0 In a February 1, 1989 memorandum, the Task Force on New Reproductive
Practices circulated the following policy recommendations to be discussed and
voted on at the March 1, 1989 meeting:
1. The State of New Jersey should enact legislation to discourage the
practice of commercial surrogacy and to prohibit its most offensive
features.
2. The State of New Jersey should enact legislation explicitly extending existing prohibitions on the payment or receipt of money or any
valuable consideration in connection with the placement for adoption of
a child to apply to (a) any payments to a broker/intermediary, and (b)
any payments (other than payment or reimbursement of medical, hospital, or other similar expenses currently allowable under adoption law) to
birth mothers, in connection with a surrogacy arrangement.
3. The State of New Jersey should enact legislation rendering certain
contractual undertakings in association with surrogacy arrangements illegal and unenforceable, including:
(a) undertakings to pay money or any valuable consideration to a
broker/intermediary;
(b) undertakings to pay money or any valuable consideration
(other than payment or reimbursement of medical, hospital, or other
similar expenses currently allowable under adoption law) to a birth
mother, in connection with the surrender or transfer of custody or relinquishment or waiver of parental rights;
(c) undertakings by a birth mother, prior to the conclusion of a
specified waiting period following the birth of the child or children, to
surrender or transfer custody or to relinquish or waive parental rights;
(d) undertakings purporting to limit the liberty of the birth
mother with respect to control over fundamental medical or lifestyle decisions during the course of her pregnancy.
4. The State of NewJersey should not legally prohibit non-commercial
surrogacy arrangements, providing such arrangements do not violate
recommendation (2) above and do not include contractual undertakings
violative of recommendation (3) above.
5. The State of New Jersey should enact legislation to govern the determination of custody, parental rights, and support obligations in the
event of disputes arising pursuant to surrogacy arrangements. Such legislation should establish a legal presumption favoring custody by the
birth mother, consistent with assuring satisfaction of the needs and welfare of the child.
Definitions:

"Surrogacy arrangement" describes an arrangement whereby a man and
a woman who is neither the man's wife nor his sexual partner contract to
produce a child who will be reared by the man and, in the typical case,
his wife. Under such an arrangement the contracting woman (the birth
mother or so-called "surrogate mother") may be the child's genetic and
gestational mother or solely the child's gestational mother.
"Commercial surrogacy" describes a surrogacy arrangement where a
fee is paid to a broker/intermediary, or where a fee (other than payment
or reimbursement of medical, hospital, or other similar expenses) is
paid to a birth mother.
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mendations seem to follow the underlying public policy
considerations adhered to by the supreme court in Baby M and,
therefore, it would appear that any legislation recommended by
the task force will merely have the legislature codify the Baby M
opinion.
Other legislatures, due in part to the publicity surrounding
Baby M, have enacted legislation dealing with surrogate parenting. In all cases but one, the legislation has sought to discourage
surrogacy either by declaring such contracts void as against public policy, " or, in one case, making the entry into such a contract
a felony under state law.' 2 The only state to pass legislation
favoring surrogate parenting is Nevada,' 3 but the extent of that
legislation is an amendment to the baby-selling statute which
provides that a payment pursuant to a surrogate parenting contract is an exception to the statute. No state has passed a comprehensive statutory scheme allowing surrogate parenting under
strict state regulation.
While no state has passed such legislation, the Family Law
Section of the American Bar Association (ABA) has drafted a
Model Surrogacy Act."4 As proposed by the ABA, the act provides that surrogacy agreements in accord with the act are valid
as a matter of public policy and may be specifically enforced." 5
The agreement must be entered into under the auspices of a
state licensed surrogacy agency." The same state agency that
licenses adoption placement agencies is responsible for licensing
Surrogates must be of at least the age of
surrogacy agencies.'
majority and have had at least one child.' Section four of the
proposed act requires that the parties undergo a series of tests to
be arranged and monitored by the agency. The surrogate and
At its March 1, 1989 meeting the Task Force on New Reproductive Practices
voted in favor of policy recommendations one, two and three. Recommendation
four was modified by taking out the language "should not legally prohibit" based
on the task force's decision to take no position on whether non-commercial surrogacy arrangements should be legalized. Recommendation five was not reached.
!" See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-8-1-1 to -5 (West 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 199.590(3) (Baldwin 1988); 1987 LA. REV. ANN. § 9:2713 (West Supp 1989); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (Supp. 1988).
92 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.859 (West 1988).
1)3 Act ofJune 26, 1987, ch. 773, § 6(5), 1987 NEV. STAT. 773.
94 ABA MODEL SURROGACY ACT (draft 1988), reprinted in Draft ABA ,11odel SumogaO' Act, 22 FAM. L. Q. 123 (1988).
95

Id. § 3(a).

Id. § 16.
Id. § 16(b)(1).
!I Id. §§ 3(d), (1).
9"
97
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the provider of genetic material for the fetus must be examined
by a licensed physician for general health, fertility, sexually transmitted diseases, mental health, any mental health problems likely
to be inherited, and any examinations recommended by the
American Fertility Society. A summary of the physician's findings must be annexed to the agreement.""
As presently written, there is no provision for genetic testing, although such testing could be recommended by the American Fertility Society. The act does provide that there shall be no
combination of genetic materials of persons related as first cousins or closer.' 0 0 There would appear to be no reason not to additionally test for genetically transmitted physical disorders such as
sickle cell anemia or Tay-Sachs disease, especially given the relatively modest cost of such testing. While states do not restrict the
choice of married couples to conceive children in the face of
known risks of genetic defects, in surrogacy, where the conception is preplanned, there are sound public health reasons to not
allow such risks, since the only goal is the need to find a genetically compatible surrogate.
As mandated by the act, a thorough mental health examination of the surrogate must be performed by a licensed doctor of
psychiatry or psychology.""' The purpose of the examination is
to determine if the surrogate "has any psychosis or mental disability that would prevent her from understanding and fulfilling
her responsibilities under a surrogacy agreement" 112 and "is
mentally and emotionally capable of entering into a surrogacy
agreement."... A written summary of these findings must be annexed to the surrogacy agreement. While apparently encompassed therein, the standard fails to specifically state that one of
the responsibilities of the surrogate is the surrender of the child.
As stated earlier, an important goal of psychological testing is to
assess whether the surrogate can resist the natural impulse to
form a psychological bond with the child that is being carried. It
is important, therefore, that the act impart to the mental health
professional that the exam specifically focus on the bonding
question.
The act also requires an examination by a social worker.

102

I § 4(a).
ld.
Id. § 4(a)(3).
I00
Id. § 4(a)(I)(D).
I01
Id. § 4(b)(1)(A).

I(I- Id. § 4(b)(l)(B).
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The social worker must obtain a complete social history of the
surrogate and determine whether the surrogate appears suited to
being a surrogate."14 In addition, the intended parents must be
examined to ascertain whether they are suitable parents. 0 5 The
social worker is available for counseling upon request by either
parties' attorneys or by the approved agency. 6 While implied in
the language of the act, there should be language to the effect
that the examination of the intended parents must be of the same
nature and rigor as that conducted pursuant to an adoption.
Section five of the act mandates certain provisions for surrogate agreements. The surrogate and, if applicable, her husband
must agree they have no parental or custodial rights to the child
and that upon birth of the child, custody shall go to the intended
parents." 7 The intended parents must agree to take custody and
responsibility for the child regardless of the child's health or any
mental or physical defects.""8 The intended parents must obtain
medical insurance for the surrogate and pay all medical expenses
in connection with the pregnancy up to six months following delivery.""' The intended parents must also obtain a life insurance
policy for the surrogate in the amount of $100,000 for the period
commencing with insemination until six months subsequent to
delivery, allowing the surrogate to designate the beneficiary.'O
They must also purchase individual policies for themselves in the
amount of $100,000 with the child as the beneficiary either directly or in trust.''' All parties must agree to the release of their
civil and criminal records.' 12 The surrogate must acknowledge
that she has been informed of the medical and psychological risks
associated with acting as a surrogate and that she has consulted
with a lawyer of her own choosing." "3Most importantly, the parbe bound by the
ties must provide in the agreement that they will
14
remedies contained in section six of the act.'
Section six provides that if the surrogate voluntarily terminates the pregnancy or the child is not related to one or both of
I'l4 Id. § 4(c)(1).
"06

1d. § 4(c)(2).
Id. § 4(c)(4).

1"7

Id. § 5(a).

105

108 ld. § 5(g).
109! Id. § 5 (c).

Id. § 5(d)(1).
Id. § 5(d)(2).
112 Id. § 5(i).
'1"

1: Ild. §§ 5(h)(3), 5(n).
114 Id. § 5(I).
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the genetic providers for reasons other than physician or laboratory error, the intended parents may sue for damages within one
year of the birth of the child. ' 15 If the termination of the pregnancy is involuntary, medically necessary or agreed to by all the
parties, the surrogate is entitled to her medical expenses and a
prorated amount of the compensation. If not paid, the surrogate
can sue for damages including attorneys fees and costs. 1 16 The
most important remedy provision provides that either party may
sue for specific performance of the contract provision to deliver
the child to the intended parents.'17 A party awarded specific
performance is also entitled to attorney's fees and costs, including any costs associated with locating the child. The action must
be brought within fourteen days of learning of the birth of the
child. A hearing is to be held seven days after service of the action on the opposing party." 8
The act establishes a new form of action for "Certification of
Parentage" to be commenced after the birth of the child.' "' It
would appear that the authors of the act hoped to create an
expeditious means of finalizing surrogate agreements that would
involve a minimal expenditure of judicial resources. 2 ' Unfortunately in doing so the authors of the act lost sight of the major
stumbling block to enforcing surrogate agreements, the very
strong state law and constitutional protections afforded the parent-child relationship. If a statute is to allow specific enforcement of the provisions of the surrogacy agreement regarding
care and custody of the child, there must be a judicial review of
the surrogate's decision at the only meaningful time, prior to
conception. Such a judicial review would have the added benefit
of providing an independent review of the agreement and the
test results that are appended thereto pursuant to section four of
the act. Allowing specific enforcement is a decision to allow a
binding waiver of the surrogate's constitutional rights. To be enforceable, such a waiver should be done under strict judicial scrutiny. Also, at least in New Jersey, the supreme court decision in
Baby M requires that for a statute to be constitutional, careful
procedures must be implemented to ensure that the waiver is vol115 Id. § 6(a).
116 Id. § 6(b).
117 Id. § 6(c).
118 Id.

1,1 Id. § 8.
See generally Gitlin, Family Law Section Approves Model Surrogacy Act: A Comment,
22 FAM. L. Q 148 (1988).
120
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untary.,2 Without a timely judicial review of the statutorily mandated tests, the surrogacy agreement and an examination under
oath of the surrogate, it is highly questionable that the act would
be found constitutional in New Jersey. Furthermore, in reviewing their own state surrogacy statutes, other state courts may very
well follow the Baby M reasoning.
As presently written the act presents a more serious problem
under the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Baby M. The
court stated that to be constitutionally permissible, any act enforcing surrogate agreements must be grounded on a compelling
state interest. The court indicated that infertility might be a compelling state interest depending on the extent of the problem.
Because the act makes surrogacy generally available regardless of
whether there is an infertility problem, in all likelihood it would
not pass constitutional muster under New Jersey law. Beyond
the apparent conflict with the Baby M decision, there are strong
public policy reasons to limit surrogacy to infertile couples. As
was stated earlier, studies have shown that while money is a
strong motivation for surrogates, equally important is the desire
to help childless couples. Removing the altruistic motivation for
surrogates can only enhance the possibility of exploitation.
The preconception inquiry outlined above replicates in
many ways the inquiry that precedes a preliminary hearing in an
adoption. It would therefore be appropriate for the court to
make a preliminary finding that custody of the child borne by the
surrogate be awarded to the natural father and his wife. The investigation of their parental fitness, coupled with the required
findings as to the surrogate's willing participation in the process,
amply justify a determination that it would be in the child's best
interests to be placed, at least initially, with the natural father and
his wife. The court should also be required to make a finding
that the natural father and the surrogate are presumed to be the
child's natural parents until proven otherwise in a court of competent jurisdiction. The birth certificate should list them as the
natural parents with the natural father's wishes controlling the
name of the child.' 2 2 Aside from resolving many of the immediate issues raised at the birth of the child, these preliminary findBaby .1, 109 N.J. at 452 n.16, 537 A.2d at 1255 n.16.
On February 7, 1989, the ABA House of Delegates rejected the Model Surrogacy Act presented by the Section of Family Law, opting instead for the Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act originally approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on August 4, 1988. Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, reprinied in 15 FAM. L. REP. 2009
121

122
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ings would further help to underscore to the surrogate the
importance and finality of her decision. A comprehensive statutory response would give infertile couples the alternative of surrogate parenting while at the same time providing extensive
procedural and substantive safeguards for all concerned and
would, hopefully, avoid the kind of bitter confusion that occurred
in Baby M.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Baby M does
not finally resolve the matter of surrogate parenting, and does
(Feb. 21, 1989). This act states in its prefatory note that the primary purpose of the
act is to protect the children of assisted conception.
The act contains two alternatives. The alternatives provide that either surrogacy agreements are deemed void or are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. This
strict regimen requires that prior to conception, a court must review the surrogacy
agreement and be satisfied that all parties entered into the agreement willingly and
knowingly. Further, there must be a showing that the intended mother is either
unable to bear a child, or pregnancy that presents an unreasonable health risk to
the intended mother of the child. The surrogate must have had at least one pregnancy and it must be shown that a second pregnancy would not pose an unreasonable health risk. Moreover, all parties must receive counseling concerning the effect
of surrogacy. Finally, both the surrogate, her husband, and the intended parents
must be investigated as to their fitness and a report of that investigation must be
made available for the court's review.
The most unique aspect of the act is that it allows a surrogate who provides the
egg for the conception 180 days after conception to change her mind and file a
written notice terminating the agreement. If she does and her husband is a party to
the agreement, the child will be theirs. If she is single or her husband is not a party
to the agreement, then paternity of the child is governed by the Uniform Parentage
Act or other applicable state law. If, however, the surrogate does not terminate the
agreement within six months, the intended parents are the parents of the child.
The custody and paternity provisions are consistent with the act's stated purpose of putting the child's interests first. Whenever possible the act opts to place
the child with one of the two possible intact families. Only when the surrogate is
single or her husband does not comply with the act's provision that he be a party,
would the child be placed in a situation where one parent has custody and the other
has visitation rights. The act significantly impacts on parental rights; however, because it does so to protect the child, there would appear to be a compelling interest
of sufficient weight to allow that interference. As to the surrogate, she receives
sufficient counseling and court supervision to ensure that the waiver of her rights is
voluntary, and in addition, she has the first six months of her pregnancy to make
such a decision. When the surrogate elects to terminate the agreement, the natural
father, in effect, becomes a sperm donor. This would appear to conflict with the
natural father's parental rights. But see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (the
United States Supreme Court raises a serious question as to the extent of any constitutionally protected liberty interest for illegitimate fathers where the only relationship with the child is biological). Even if the liberty interest exists, the
compelling state interest to act in the best interests of the child should save the
statute from constitutional challenge.
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not even address what may very well be the next case to be decided in this area, a dispute where the surrogate is only the birth
mother. There has been already at least one birth where a surrogate carried a fetus to term which was conceived by IVF with the
genetic material contributed by the prospective parents. In the
Baby M case there was no question as to the identity of the natural mother and father, thus making it possible for the court to
decide the case based on existing analogous law. As scientific
responses to infertility break down the traditional notion of
parenting into its component parts, it becomes increasingly difficult for the courts to resolve disputes arising out of these arrangements. The Baby 1M opinion underscores rather than
obviates the need for a comprehensive legislative response to
surrogacy. In the final paragraph of the opinion, Chief Justice
Wilentz invites the legislature to consider not only the ramifications of surrogacy, but also biotechnology such as IVF. As stated
by the chiefjustice, "[t]he problem is how to enjoy the benefits of
the technology-especially for infertile couples-while minimizing the risk of abuse. ' 2" Only through comprehensive legislation can the interests of all the parties, including the child, be
addressed and protected properly.
123 Bab) M, 109 N.J. at 469, 537 A.2d at 1264.

